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ABSTRACT 
This paper applies the theory of optimal investment und er 
risk to the problem of evaluating building codes to make s tructures 
more resistant to earthquakes . A simple equation is derived that 
can be used to es timate the implicit values of the social cos ts of 
earthquake damages that are necessary to j us tify an increment to the 
seismic resistivity of a s tructure, and an illus trative empirical 
application is made to evaluate a recently proposed earthquake 
building cod e .  The paper also examines the effects o f  earthquake 
prediction information on both private decisions regarding the 
s tructural integr i ty of buildings and the social attractiveness o f  
seismic building codes. 
THE ECONOMICS OF BUILDING CODES TO RESIST S EIS}!IC SHOCK 
Linda Cohen and Roger Noll* 
The p urpose of this paper is to apply economic analysis 
to the problem of evaluating building codes that are designed to 
mitigate the damaging effects of earth quakes . Ear thquake damage 
is a probabilistic event, and the bes t  technology for mitigating 
earthquake damage entails increasing the capital costs of threatened 
s tr uctures . Consequently, selecting an op timal seismic resis tivity 
for buildings is a problem in optimal investment planning when returns 
are risky . Mos t  types of disas ters and defenses against them also 
have these general characteristics, and the methods used in this 
paper apply to evaluating defenses against all s uch disasters ,  ranging 
from flood control proj ects to emergency core cooling systems for 
nuclear reactors .  Nevertheless,  each form of disas ter has unique 
technical characteristics that are of potentially great empirical 
importance . Hence, this p ap �r eschews generality and deals explicitly 
with the problem of selecting op timal building s tandards in seismically 
active areas . 
* Harvard University and California Ins titute of Technology,
respectively . Part of the costs of preparing this manuscript
were financed by a grant from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and part by a grant from the National Science
Foundation program of Research Applied to National Needs,  grant
no . AOI75-1 6566A01 . We are grateful to George Housner , Paul 
Joskow, James Rosse  and an anonymous referee for comments on 
an earlier draft.
2 
For the mos t  part, seismic codes apply to new s tructures, 
The codes specify minimum design features that new structures mus t 
match or beat. The codes are designed so that a conforming s tr ucture 
will be able to withs tand a specified intensity of violent ground 
motions without collapsing, although building to code also diminishes 
the damage to the s tr uc ture from earth quakes that are not severe 
enough to cause the building to collapse . In some ins tances , new 
information about the vulnerability of s tructures or the nature of 
the threat of an earth quake in a p articular area leads local 
governments to adop t codes for exis ting buildings as well as new 
structures .  For example, the Field Act in California, passed 
after the damaging Long Beach ear thquake of 1934, required that 
all schools in the s tate, old and new, be made to withstand a maj or 
earthquake . In the aftermath of the 1971 San Fernando earth quake, 
measures have been adop ted or proposed that would re quire retrofitting 
of particularly hazardous s tructures ,  s uch as dams, p ublic meeting 
halls and theaters ,  to bring them up to the s tandards required of 
new s tructures . 
The primary economic j us tification for seismic building 
codes is that the s truc tural soundness of a building has a social 
value that is not likely to be taken into
. 
account by its o vmer . -
1 
_/ The analysis in this paper ignores argumen ts for building codes
and o ther p ublic policies related to disas ters that presume an 
inability of humans to calculate accurate pro babilities of disas ters 
or to behave rationally when confronted by low-pro bability ,  
catastrophic contingencies . 
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If a building collapses d uring an earthquake, the owner s uffers a 
financial loss e qual to the value of the s tructure . But the 
collapse of a building can h ave a higher social cost than s imply i ts 
asset value . First, occupants of the building or persons in its 
immediate vicinity may be killed or maimed by the collapsing s truc ture . 
Second, other capital assets, s uch as adjacent buildings or vehicles, 
may be damaged by i ts collap s e .  Third, government resources are 
used to clean up part of damage of an earthquake and to retain order 
in damaged areas . 
The owner of a building lacks the incentive to consider the 
f ull social cos t  of the collapse of a building, even if the owner is 
liable to compensa te persons who s uf fer damage when the building 
collapses . For several reason s ,  complete compensation is unlikely 
to be paid, and so the owner will not be led to minimize the sum of 
the costs of earth quake defenses and liability for earthquake related 
damages, First, the collapse of a building may bankrupt its owner . 
In any event, the wealth of the owner, whether an individual or a 
corporation, represents the legal limit to compens ation . Second, 
s ince an important element of the damage of an earth quake is loss of 
life and serious inj uries , compensation is likely to be, at best, 
arbitrary, if not systematically too small . Third, whatever their 
merit as policies, governmental disas ter relief programs are , in 
effect, social ins urance policies that pay a s ubs tantial part of the 
costs of a disaster . These programs affect incentives to defend 
agains t disasters, creating a type of moral hazard problem . -
/ 
Four th,  
_I 
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Linda Cohen, "A Public Policy Approach to the S tudy of Optimal 
Compensation Sys tems : the Case of the Price-Anderson Ac t," 
Kennedy School of Government Discussion Paper No . 61D, Harvard 
University, February 1 979. 
in a maj or earthquake the cause of a particular part of the damage 
is likely to be difficult if not impossible to ascertain . If a 
block of buildings collapses , it is difficult to determine which 
would have withstood the earthquake if others had not collapsed , and 
which individuals and vehicles in the surrounding area were damaged 
by which building .-/ 
_/ This paper does not systematically examine taxation accord ing to 
the s eismic vulnerabili ty of a s tructure as an alterna tive to codes . 
Obviously, bas ing taxes in part on seismic risk categories may be 
a desirable policy, although it has certain problems owing to the 
uncer tainties as sociated with the likelihood an earthquake will 
occur, the actual seismic resis tivity of any par ticular method of 
cons truction before a s tructure has been subj ec ted to seismic shock, 
and the fact that earthquake damage is sometimes dif ficult to 
attribute to any particular building or structural feature. 
Much of the damage associated with earthquakes is so-called 
secondary damage -- that is , destruction caused not by the earthquake 
directly, but by o ther problems that arise because of the ear thquake. 
For example, more than ninety percent of the damage and deaths 
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associated with the 1 906 San Francisco earthquake were d irectly 
I 
attributable to the ensuing fire . - If the collapse of one building 
_/ Charles Boden, "San Francisco ' s  Cisterns," California H
istorical
Quarterly, Vol . 15, No . 4 (1937) , pp . 1 -13. 
is accompanied by fire , at what point does fire damage cease to be 
the responsibility of the owner of the collapsed s tructure and begin 
to be the responsibility of the local fire department? In New York 
State, for example, in the case of a fire resulting from negligence, 
liability is limited to damages to the s tructures that are adj acent 
to the s tructure in which the fire s tarted . Owners of all o ther 
damaged s tructures have no claims against the negligent party or owners 
of structures through which the fire passed . -
/ 
Al though there are 
_/ Marc Franklin, Tor t  Law and Alternatives : Injuries and Remedies,
The Foundation Press, Inc . ,  Mineola, New York (1971 ) , pp . 170-171 . 
economically sound historical reasons for this policy, i ts perverse 
incentives vis-a-vis ear thquake r esistent construc tion practices are clear . 
In sum, determining who is liable for the damages suffered 
by each person as a result of an earthquake is an all bu t impossible 
task, and probably fruitless in any event because some who are 
ultimately held responsible for the damage will be unable to 
compensate the victims. Seismic building codes are one mechanism 
for dealing with this problem. A properly d esigned code can effect 
an approximate internalization of the social costs of earth quake 
damage. 
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The next section develops a s imple theoretical model o f  
the choice of a n  optimal building code, given that differing codes 
imply differing cos t  increments for s tr uctures and provide differing 
degrees of protection from s eismic shock . The p urpose o f  the section 
is to derive equations tha t  can be estimated using the limited data 
now availabl e .  S everal important simplifying assumptions are 
employed ; these are relaxed in Section III. 
The s econd section examines the rud imentary data that are 
available to examine the extent to which building codes might be s aid 
to be economically optimal . Because the benefits o f  codes include 
savings in human lives and inj uries tha t  are difficult, if no t 
impossible, to evaluate, no definitive j udgment on codes is o ffered . 
Instead, the second section contains a calculation o f  the magnitude 
of these benefits that would rationalize exis ting and proposed codes . 
The third section provides a theoretical analysis o f  the 
effects o f  changes in the expected frequency of earthquakes on 
decisions about optimal seismic resistivity .  This analysis i s  useful 
for gaining insights about the likely e ffect o f  the development of 
techniques for predicting earthquakes . 
I. A S IMPLE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The pro blem o f  devising an optimal seismic building code 
is regarded here as equivalent to a pro blem of minimizing the cos ts 
of a long-lived capital investment, includ ing the expected damage o f  
earthquakes. The extent to which this random event undermines the 
value o f  the asset depends upon the amount o f  defensive expenditure 
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made at the time the investment was made .  
Henceforth, the following no tation will be adopted: 
K = investment in the s tr uc ture that yields income, 
including the contents of the structure . 
x 
p ( t) 
i 
the additional inves tment in a s tr ucture for the 
p urpose o f  increasing its resistivity to s eismic 
shocks, measured as a percent of income-earning 
investment K ( the total investment in the s tr ucture 
is (1 + x)K) . 
the probability that an earthquake will occur at time t 
that causes s truc tural collapse i f  x = O .  
a measure o f  the intensity of ground shaking 
associated with earthquakes . 
r = the market rate of interest. 
v 
N 
q (i)  
f(K, x, i) 
the rate o f  depreciation of the s tr uc ture . 
the useful life o f  the s truc ture . 
the proba bility that shaking of intensity i will 
occur at the s ite of the s truc ture, given that a 
major earth quake has occurred in the area. 
the proportion of the income-earning investment in the 
s truc ture, K, that wo uld be destroyed by ground shaking 
of intensity i if defensive expenditures xK have been 
made on the s tr ucture . 
The damage func tion, f, is assumed to d epend on K; that is,  
a given p ercentage increment in cos ts for a s truc ture has a different 
protective effect on buildings of di ffering costs . In general, 
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larger s tr uctures are more likely to be damaged by an earthquake . 
In reality, of course, other s truc tural features of a building, s uch 
as height and cons truction materials, determine in part the 
relationship between the amount of damage s uffered and the expendi tures 
on defense agains t seismic shocks . Nevertheless, as a general 
proposition, bigger s tructures are more prone to damage given 
any intensity i (e . g . f
K 
> 0) and benefit more from defensive e xpenditures 
( fKx < 0) . Since f (K, x, i) mus t be bounded above by one and below
by zero, at leas t for large values of K and x, fKK _::_ 0 and 
f xx � 0 .
The earthquake pro bability f unction, p ( t) , would normally 
be estimated from historical frequencies of damaging earthquakes , 
although in the f uture reliable earthquake predic tions may be possible . 
Because damage from ground motion diminishes as one moves away from 
the center of an earthquake, p ( t) varies from location to location.  
The characterization of ground shaking used in this model 
is greatly s implified from reality, but is s ufficient to capture the 
policy problem at issue .  The function p ( t) i s  the p.d . f .  that an 
earthquake of s ufficiently large magnitude to impose uncompensated 
losses will occur at time t .  Because the principal external cos ts 
of earthquakes arise only when s truc tural collapse occurs, small 
earthquakes which cause some private loss es are ignored . Moreover, 
earthquakes are assumed here to be s ufficiently infrequent that at 
mos t  one damaging earthquake will occur d uring the planned life of  
the structure.  
The expec ted life of a s tructure is ass umed to be 
independent of the amount of seismic resistivity built into it.  
9 
In reality ,  the type of reinforcing tha t  makes a building more 
earth quake resistant also increases its d urability. If N is large, 
as is the case for nearly all buildings, the discounted present 
value of the income s tream added because of the building code is 
small, and the analysis is greatly simplified if it is ignored. 
The pro blem of picking an optimal building code is regarded 
as e quivalent to picking an optimal value of x, the proportion of 
the capital inves tment that is attributable to addi tional seismic 
resistivity over that which would be built into the s truc t ure 
inadverten tly, even if the s truc ture were located in an area with 
no seismic risk . Of course, a modern s truc ture is naturally 
resistant to earthquakes because design features that add to 
its longevity, ins ulation from wind resis tance ( in the case of tall 
s truc tures) , and other desirable structural characteristics also 
make the building somewhat res istant to seismic shock . The variable 
x measures expenditures specifically for the purpose of providing 
added seismic resistivity .  
This par ticular formulation o f  the problem pres umes that 
building codes are s uboptimized, i . e. , that they specify the maximal 
seismic resis tivity available at the cos t of implementing the codes, 
For most types of building codes ,  this would be a facetious 
ass umption, because the point of many codes is to protect particular 
product and labor inputs ; however in the case of building codes in 
s eismically threatened areas , the ass umption pro bably is not 
violently wrong . Academic structural engineers play a maj or role in 
des igning and evaluating seismic codes , and receive no 
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economic benefits from the effects of the codes on the choice of 
building inputs. Moreover, the codes are based in part on experimental 
and theoretical engineering research that is widely published in the 
professional literature, and subject to disinterested professional 
scrutiny. Thus, it is not likely that, for any given degree of seismic 
resistivity contemplated in a code, an alternative technology is 
readily available that could provide the same protection at 
significantly lower cost. Of course, it may still be the case that 
the extent of seismic resistivity that is implicit in the code is 
not optimal. 
The firm's optimal choice of x is that value that minimizes 
private costs, i.e. the sum of the initial investment and expected 
earthquake damage. The latter is the depreciated cost of the 
investment at the time of the earthquake, so some specific time path 
of the building's market value -- a depreciation rate, v -- must be 
incorporated into the analysis. This, the cost-minimization problem 
is as follows: 
(1) 
min 
x K(l+x) + 
-(r+v)t 
p(t)f(K,x,i)e q(i)dt di . 
In this formulation, the frequency of earthquakes is assumed to be 
sufficiently low that no more than one will occur during the life of 
a building. Consequently, after an earthquake occurs, no additional 
value is derived from expenditures xK on seismic resistivity. Moreover, 
the term representing earthquake damage is simplified to represent the 
expected damage from precisely one possibility of an earthquake during 
the N years of a structure's life. 
The first order condition for cost minimization is: 
(2 ) K + K p(t)e dt f
N
O 
-(r+v )
t 
I 
f 
i 
0 
f (K,x,i)q(i)di 
x 
0 • 
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If the further assumptions are made that v can be approximated by N and 
that the probability of an earthquake is uniformly distributed with 
respect to time, equation ( 2 )  with the integration performed and 
rearranged, reduces to: 
(3) 
1 
+ P 
(1-e -(
l
r + 
i )
N ) JI fx(K,x,i)q(i)di 0 
The integral 
r +il i 0 � fx(K,x,i)q(i)di 
i 
0 
i, and is denoted by G(fx(K,x,i)). 
is the expected value of fx over 
In nearly all cases, the value of N is very large. 
Consequently, expression (3) can be simplified by use of the 
following approximation: 
1 
r 
In the analysis to follow, this simplification will be used rather than 
estimating the true value of N and evaluating the complicated exponential. 
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To generalize the cost-minimization problem to account 
for external costs, another element is added to the optimization 
problem that represents the costs of earthquake damage that are not 
borne by owners of a structure. Two additional terms must be defined: 
E(K,i) = the external costs caused by ground shaking of 
intensity i at a structure of size K, if it were 
constructed without account being taken of earthquake 
risks; 
g(K,x,i) the proportion of loss E(K,i) that is suffered if 
xK is spent on defense. 
The function E(K,i) covers a multitude of damages, running 
from the easily monetizable (e. g. government disaster relief expenditures 
to clean up rubble) to the dubiously monetizable (e.g. pain, suffering 
and death of persons in or around the collapsed structure). Again for 
ease of exposition, these damages are assumed not to be time-dependent. 
The external damage function is included here for the purpose 
of examining qualitatively its implications in the optimization 
problem, not because there is much hope of estimating the function 
empirically. Here E(K,i) is assumed to rise as K increases because 
larger buildings effect more people and a wider area when they 
collapse; e. g. EK(K,i) > O.
The function g(K,x,i) serves the same purpose as did 
f(K,x,i) in the private cost-minimization problem. It is assumed 
that expenditures on defense against earthquakes reduce external costs 
and are more important in large structures. Moreover, because g(K,x,i) 
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£ [O,l], the function must for some range become less sensitive to 
further increases in K and x. These requirements can be expressed 
as: 
g < O; x - gKK 
_:::_ 0 for K > K*; gxx > 0 for x 2_ x*; g < o. xK -
The assumption that the same x enters f(K,x,i) and g(K,x,i) 
presumes an identity of actions to protect buildings and measures to 
protect people. While this may be generally correct, there may be 
exceptions. For example, flexible high-rise structures may be more 
resistant to seismic shocks than rigid buildings, but the people at the 
top of flexible buildings may be injured by being flung about as the 
structures sway in response to a seismic shock. The analysis in this 
paper ignores any potential conflicts between saving lives and 
protecting buildings. 
Social welfare maximization entails including the external 
costs of an earthquake in the private optimization problem, thereby 
arriving at the following cost-minimization problem: 
Min 
x 
I N 
K(l+x) + J J 
i 0 0 
r, -(r+v)t 
-st] ) LKf(K,x,i)e +E(K,i)g(K,x,i)e p(t)q(i dtdi 
where s is the social discount rate. 
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The second term i n  brackets represents the external costs o f  earthquakes, 
and the entire integrand represents the expected social loss in a time 
interval. The social discount rate, s, is not necessarily the same as 
the rate, r, used in the rest of the objective expression. Writing 
these rates as different parameters avoids taking an explicit stand 
on the appropriate discount rate to apply to irreversible events, such 
as the loss of life. Whether s=r, s=O, or O<s<r is not germane for 
the purposes of this paper because no attempt will be made to evaluate 
the social externalities associated with an earthquake. 
As is readily apparent, the first-order condition for this 
problem contains the terms in the first-order condition for private 
cost minimization, plus an additional term reflecting external costs. 
Making the same assumptions as were made in the preceding analysis, 
this term reduces to: 
I -;- f E(K,i)gx(K,x,i)di, 
i 
0 
in which the integral is the expected external damage if a damaging 
earthquake occurs, which is henceforth written as H(E,gx). The 
assumptions on functional forms imply that this expression will be 
negative as long as further effective earthquake defenses are available. 
Hence, the value of x that satisfies (3) (and thereby minimizes private 
costs) will be too small to minimize social costs. The equilibrium 
condition for minimizing social cost can be written as: 
.E. rG(f ) + H(E,g )] r L x x o. (3) I 
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II. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
The strategy of this section is to provide a crude index 
of the extent to which the expression for private profit maximization 
is in disequilibrium. If building codes require an investment in 
earthquake defenses that diverges from the optimal private value of x, 
then expression (3) will not be satisfied. However, expression (3) 
minimizes only private structural costs. If society is optimizing 
building codes, the disequilibrium will indicate the social valuation 
of the nonstructural costs of earthquake damage; that is, the actual 
value of - .E. G(f ) is the value that 12. H(E,g ) must take to minimize 
r x r x 
social costs. Thus, the extent to which the expenditures on defenses 
diverge from the cost-minimizing equilibrium provides a measure of 
the value of the external effects of earthquakes that is embodied in 
the codes, that is, an estimate of the social valuation of 
I 
� f E(K,i)gx(K,x,i)di 
i 
0 
The desirability of a code can then be viewed as a subjective assessment 
of whether this implicit valuation of external effects is reasonable. 
The empirical analysis to follow must be a crude approximation 
to reality. One source of difficulty is due to the fact that each 
structure is to some degree unique. The likelihood that a structure 
will collapse in an earthquake depends upon the location of the 
structure relative to the epicenter, the magnitude of the earthquake, 
the orientation of the axes of the structure in relation to the 
direction of ground mo tion due to the earthquake, the composition of
1 6  
the ground o n  which the structure is built, and numerous other 
features that are specific to the site, the structure and the nature 
of the earthquake threat that it faces. The problem of designing an 
optimal degree of seismic resistivity into a structure is, therefore, 
unique to each building. A uniform building code is intrinsically 
inefficient in that it requires some degree of uniformity among 
structures that is not strictly desirable. As local government has 
become more sophisticated about the nature of the threat of earthquakes, 
building codes have begun to move in the direction of design 
standards based on the characteristics of a building site that affect 
its seismic vulnerability.-/ N evertheless, given the costs of writing 
_/ For example, in Long Beach, California, old commercial structures 
and apartment houses are assigned to a "seismic hazard" category. 
Each design feature that is related to seismic vulnerability is 
assigned a score, and the total score for the structure determines 
its risk category. Owners are given a fixed amount of time to 
improve the seismic resistivity of the structure or remove it, with 
the amount of time being shorter for greater risks. Owners can 
stretch this period by repairing part of the hazard and causing the 
building to move to a lower risk category. 
and enforcing a unique code for each structure, the least costly 
strategy is likely to be to maintain considerable uniformity of 
treatment among buildings. In most localities, the movement away 
from uniform codes is only beginning. Consequently, an empirical 
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analysis must be a fictional representation of conditions for a 
"representative" structure. 
Expression ( 3 )  has minimal data requirements. In order to 
determine whether equation ( 3 )  is satisfied for a particular type of 
structure, one need only know: (1) the annual probability of an 
earthquake, (2) the proportion of the area exposed to different amounts 
of ground shaking intensity, given a major earthquake, ( 3) the life of 
the structure if no earthquake occurs, ( 4 )  the long-term interest rate, 
and (5) the expected reduction in the proportion of damage to the 
investment due to a given intensity of ground shaking that was 
accomplished by the last percentage point increase in the fraction of 
building costs that is attributable to seismic resistivity. 
Earthquake Frequencies and Intensities 
One inescapable data requirement for estimating the 
appropriate amount of seismic defenses in the manner implied by the 
proceeding model is information about the frequency of damaging 
earthquakes. Perhaps surprisingly, little information is available 
about the frequency of earthquakes in specific locations. Damaging 
earthquakes are very rare events, even in seismically active areas, 
and meaningful data on the intensity of earthquakes has been collected 
only for about the last hundred years. Two measures of earthquake 
intensity are commonly used: Richter Magnitude (RM) and Modified 
Mercalli Intensity (MMI). The former is a measure of the energy 
released during the peak of an earthquake at its epicenter, and the 
latter is a crude categorization scale based upon the effects of the 
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earthquake a t  a particular point. 
The Mercalli measure is made at each location affected by an 
earthquake, and varies from one location to another according to 
distance from the epicenter of the earthquake and ground conditions. 
Because the concern here is with structural damage, the MMI scale is 
the appropriate measure. That is, the function p(t) will denote the 
frequency of earthquakes that measure at least some minimally damaging 
value of MMI. The maximum intensity of ground shaking due to an 
earthquake is commonly denoted by MMI0• 
Table 1 shows the surprisingly vague standard definitions 
of the twelve categories of the Mercalli intensity. M!1I VIII 
represents the threshold at which structural collapse of modern 
buildings occurs. As Table 5, below, shows, MMI VIII is also the 
minimum intensity at which any substantial number of modern buildings 
will suffer heavy damage. Accordingly, p ( t) will measure the 
frequency of ground shaking of at least MMI VIII. 
I. 
II. 
III. 
TABLE l 
Modified Mercalli Intensity Categories 
N ot felt except by a very few under especially favorable 
circumstances. 
Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors 
of buildings. Delicately suspended objects may swing. 
Felt quite noticeably indoors, especially on upper floors of 
buildings, but many people do not recognize it as an earthquake. 
Standing motor cars may rock slightly. Vibration like passing 
of truck. Duration estimated. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
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During the day felt indoors by many, outdoors by few. At night 
some awakened. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls made 
creaking sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking building. 
Standing motor cars rocked noticeably. 
Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows, 
etc. , broken; a few instances of cracked plaster; unstable 
objects overturned. Disturbance of trees, poles, and other tall 
objects sometimes noticed. Pendulum clocks may stop. 
Felt by all; many frightened and run outdoors. Some heavy 
furniture moved; a few instances of fallen plaster or damaged 
chimneys. Damage slight. 
Everybody runs outdoors. Damage negligible in buildings of 
good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built 
ordinary structures; considerable in poorly built or badly 
designed structures; some chimneys broken. N oticed by persons 
driving motor cars. 
VIII. Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable in 
ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse; great in 
poorly built structures. Panel walls thrown out of frame 
IX. 
structures. Fall of chimney, factory stacks, columns, monuments, 
walls. Heavy furniture overturned. Sand and mud ejected in 
small amounts. Changes in well water. Disturbs persons 
driving motor cars. 
Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed 
frame structures thrown out of plumb; great in substantial build­
ings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations. 
Ground cracked conspicuously. Underground pipes broken. 
x. 
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Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and 
frame structures destroyed with foundations; ground badly cracked, 
Rails bent, Landslides considerable from river banks and steep 
slopes. Shifted sand and mud. Water splashed (slopped) over banks, 
XI. Few, if any, (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges 
XII. 
destroyed, Broad fissures in ground. Underground pipe lines 
completely out of service, Earth slumps and land slips in 
soft ground. Rails bent greatly. 
Damage total, Waves seen on ground surfaces. Lines of sight 
and level distorted. Objects thrown upward into the air. 
Source: S, T. Algermissen, et al. , A Study of Earthquake Losses in the 
Los Angeles, California Area, U. S. Government Printing Office, 
1973. 
The frequency of intense ground shaking due to earthquakes 
varies according to location, and so empirical application of the 
general method developed in this paper must be site-specific. The 
data used here are from California where information about earthquakes 
has been systemmatically gathered for the longest period of time,-1 
_/ In part, California has better data because it is in an active 
seismic region, but this is not the only explanation, Major 
earthquakes are roughly as great a threat in several other parts 
of the United States -- notably Alaska, parts of the Rocky Mountain 
Area, Missouri, Tennessee, and Eastern Massachussetts. Another 
factor contributing to the richer data base in California is the 
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extent and quality of research on seismology at the U. S. Geological 
Survey offices in California and at the state's major universities, 
notably Caltech, U. C. Berkeley and Stanford. The modern science of 
geophysics was, for the most part, invented in California, and 
California had the first extensive seismic network for measuring 
earthquakes. 
The estimate of P(t) is necessarily crude, because data on major 
earthquakes are extremely scarce, even in California. The lowest 
magnitude Southern California earthquake which has a recorded intensity 
of MMI VIII measured 5.8 on the Richter scale. -1 Earthquakes of roughly 
_/ S. T. Algermissen, et al. , A Study of Earthquake Losses in the 
Los Angeles, California Area, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973. 
this magnitude occur about every two years, but most often are centered 
in unpopulated areas and, therefore, cause no significant damage. Great 
earthquakes causing widespread damage are sufficiently infrequent that 
few have been observed. But this does not make the major earthquakes 
necessarily of lesser importance. The more intense the earthquake, 
the larger the area affected by it. A magnitude 6.0 earthquake will 
cause severe ground motion and serious structural damage in an area with 
a radius of about fifteen miles, but is unlikely to cause structural 
collapse of modern buildings; the area of damaging shaking has a 
radius of about 50 miles for a magnitude 7. 0 earthquake and of about 
90 miles for a magnitude 8.2, although in both instances the area in 
which structural collapse will occur is much smaller.-/ Housner has 
2 2  
_/ G. W .  Housner, "Vibration o f  Structures Induced b y  Seismic Waves: 
Part I - Earthquakes," in M. Harris and E. Crede, Shock and Vibration 
Handbook Vol. 3, McGraw-Hill, 1961. 
estimated the frequency of earthquakes in California by Richter 
magnitude and the area of severe shaking associated with each magnitude. 
The results are summarized in Table 2 .  The Housner radius includes 
shaking of intensity MMI VII or greater. 
TABLE 2 
Probable N umber of Earthquakes and Area of Severe Ground 
Motion Per Century by Richter Magnitude for State of California 
Richter 
Magnitude 
6 . 0 - 6 . 3 
6. 4 - 6. 7 
6. 8 - 7. 3 
7. 4 - 7. 9 
8. 0 - up
N umber of 
Earthquakes 
per 100 Years 
4 6  
2 7  
19. 3 
5. 6 
1. 1 
Area in Square Miles 
Subject to Severe 
Ground Shaking per 
Earthquake 
1, 000 
3, 000 
8, 000 
15, 000 
25, 000 
Total Area Affected 
by all Earthquakes 
of Magnitude Class 
4 6, 000 
81, 000 
154 , 000 
84 , 000 
28, 000 
Source: Based upon data and calculations in G. W. Housner, ibid. 
Using these data and Housner's calculation regarding the 
area affected by earthquakes of varying magnitudes, the size of the 
areas affected by earthquakes of each range of magnitudes can also 
be estimated, as is shown in Table 2 .  The last column sums to 
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approximately 400, 000 square miles; considering that California 
contains approximately 150 , 000 square miles and that nearly all of 
the state is seismically active, these data imply that a particular 
seismically active location can expect to experience severe ground 
shaking about once every thirty to forty years. 
Ground shaking of a severity postulated in the calculations 
shown in Table 2 does not necessarily lead to structural collapse. 
Table 3 compares RM and MMI for 23 Southern California earthquakes that 
occurred from 1907 to 1973, for which estimates of both intensity measures 
have been made. The Housener calculation is intended to include areas of 
TABLE 3 
Relationship Between Richter Magnitude 
and Modified Mercalli Intensity: 1907-1973 
N umber with HMI 
Range of Magnitude N umber of Earthquakes or above 
5. 8 - 6. 1 11 3 
6.2 - 6. 5 8 4 
6. 6 - up 4 4 
VIII 
Source: S. T. Algermissen, et al. , A Study of Earthquake Losses in the 
Los Angeles, California Area, U. S. Government Printing Office, 
1973. 
serious structural damage that falls short of collapse, as is evident 
by the inclusion of magnitude 6 . 0  - 6 . 3 earthquakes in the calculations. 
These earthquakes are rarely associated with the collapse of modern 
structures, or with large nonstructural costs, as is shown below. 
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Wiggins and Moran have p resented a f ormal representation of 
the relat i onships among Mercalli Intensity , Richter magnit ude and the 
distance ( r) from the epicenter of the earthquake as f ollows:-
1 
NMI 4 . 7  + l. 04RM - 3 . 1 4  log r.  
_I J, H.  Wiggins and D. H. Moran, Earthquake Saf ety in Long Beach Based
on the Concept of Balanced Risk, J. H. Wiggins Co. ,  1 971 (mimeo) . 
This equation should not be taken t oo seriously . Wiggins and Moran 
provide no j ustification f or the f unctional f orm nor any measures of 
the statistical s i gnificance of either the individual variables or the 
equation as a whole . Thus , whether the relation is even remotely 
accurat e  f or large earthquakes , which lay at the extreme values 
covered by the data being analyzed and which necessari ly constitut e  a 
small part of the sample owing t o  their infrequency, remains in doubt 
but seems unlikely . In any event , the equation s uggests that the 
MMI VII region f or a magnitude 8. 0 earthquake constitutes a bout half of 
the total area that s uffers significant damage . The imp lication is 
that less than half of the areas included in the calculations in 
Table 3 are shaken severely enough so that heavy s t ruct ural damage or 
collapse is a pos s i bility . If so,  the f requency of shaking of 
intensity MMI VIII or greater a t  a given location is half the 
frequency of maj or earthquakes , or, at mos t ,  once every s ixty t o  eighty 
years . Thus , in estimating expression ( 9) , values of p less than 
.02 a re appropriat e .  
Val ues o f  q (i) a r e  even more uncerta in than for p ( t). Table 2, 
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the Wiggins-Moran relation ,  and other data on the relative f requencies 
of various degrees of shaking intensity s ugges t that for earthquakes 
that may cause struc t ural c ollapse,  more than half the area shaken 
is s ubj ect to MHI VIII and a bout one-fourth to MMI IX. The remaind er 
is s ubj ect to more s evere ground shaking.  
Relating Earthquake Intensi t y  to Damages 
An estimate of the proportion of the investment lost d ue t o  
ground shaking is dependent on the nature of t h e  s t ructure . Whitman , 
et al. , have estimated the probabilities of varying degrees of 
damage t o  8-13 s t ory s t ruct ures of a particular design, given the 
Mercalli intensity of the earthquake at the site of the s t ructure . 
Table 4 defines the damage categories used by Whitman , et al. 
TABLE 4 
Relationship of Structural Damage t o  Death and Inj ury 
Damage Fraction of Fraction of Fraction of 
Stat e  Structure Lost Occupants Killed Occupants Inj ured 
Mod erate . 05 0 . 01 
Heavy . 30 . 0025 . 02 
Total 1 . 00 . 01 . 1 0  
Collapse 1 . 00 . 20 1 . 00 
Source: R. V. Whi tman, J, M. Bi ggs , J, E. Brennan III ,  C .  A .  Cornell, 
R. L .  d eNeufville and E.  H. Vanmarcke , "Seismic Desi gn 
Decision Ana lysis , "  Journal of the Struc tural Division ,  
American Society of Structural Engineers , May 1 975, p .  1077. 
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Of course, because larger buildings are more vulnera ble t o  earthquakes, 
the  figures in  Table 4 would be substantially smaller f or one or two 
s t ory s tructures . An important element of this ta ble is its 
demonstration of the fact that the damage t o  a s t ructure must be 
fairly s evere before many of the occupants of the structure are likely 
t o  be hur t .  
Table 5 shows the effect on the probability that the 
hypothetical 8-13 s t ory s tructure will suffer each damage s tate 
of different values of the Mercalli Intensity of the earthquake and 
differences in the seismic res istivity of the s tructure . Three 
s eismic codes are shown: UBC 0-1 corres ponds to the cons truction 
of modern buildings without reference t o  the s eismicity of the site; 
UBC 3 corres ponds to the codes now in force in mos t  localities in 
which the threat of earthquakes is greatest within the United States , 
such as Cali f ornia; and UBC S represents new s t andards that have 
been developed during the 1970s that would make buildings more 
resisten t  to earthquakes than do the old UBC 3 codes . 
Evaluating Seismic Codes 
In order to es tima te the va lue of 
I 
I f (K,x,i ) q ( i ) d i  
. x 
10 
= G ( fx (K,x,i) ) in expression (3) , information mus t  be obtained on the 
changes in expected losses f or each relevant intensity level, i, and 
in cons truction cos ts due to a change in building codes . The ratio, �! • 
of these two changes can be used t o  estimate G (f
x (K,x,i ) ) ,
2 7  
TABLE 5 
Proba bility of Damage State f or Various 
Ear thquake Intensities and Seismic Bui lding Codes 
Merca lli Intens ity of Ear thquake 
Code Damage State MM V II MM VIII MN IX MM X NN XII 
UBC 0 -1 Moderate . 33 . 20 0 0 0 
Heavy . 0 4  .41 0 0 0 
Total 0 . 34 . 75 . 25 0 
Collapse 0 .05 . 25 . 75 1 . 00 
UBC 3 Moderate . 25 . 53 .20 0 0 
Heavy 0 . 21 . 52 0 () 
Total 0 . 01 . 23 . 80 0 
Collapse 0 0 . 05 . 20 1 . 00 
UBC S Moderate . 21 . 52 . 30 0 0 
Heavy 0 . 0 8  . 58 0 0 
Total 0 0 . 02 . 90 0 
Collapse 0 0 0 . 10 1 . 00 
Source: Whitman, et al. , p. 1077. 
28 
Tables 2 ,  4 and 5 p rovide the information necessary t o  es timate the 
change in expected losses . Multiplication of the damage estimates f or 
each type of s t ructure in Table 4 and the p robabi lities of damage 
s tates , given the occurrence of an earthq uake, in Table 5, p roduces 
the expected loss f rom each intensity of earthquake f or each type of 
s t ructure. If these ent ries are then multiplied by the relative 
f requencies of each intensity level of earthquake and the p roducts 
are s ummed f or each category of s t ruct ure , the res ults are the expected 
damage to each type of s t ruc t ure , conditional on the occ urrence of a 
damaging earthquake .  The value t o  a building owne r  of a movement 
from UBC 3 to UBC S, which is the relevant choice in m os t  c ommunities 
in s eismically active areas, can be es t imated by comparing these 
expected los ses . The res ult of these calc ulati ons is that the change 
in bui lding codes makes a meas urable difference t o  building owne rs 
only in the two s i t uations in which the code s ubstantially affects the 
p robability of t ot a l  los s :  MMI VIII and MMI IX. The expected loss 
under UBC S differs f rom the loss under UBC 3 by 5 and 24 percen t ,  
respectively ,  f o r  these two intensi ties . According t o  the p re ceding 
calculations on the likelihood of severe earthq uakes , the relative 
f requencies of these s tates are one-half f or MMI VIII and one -fourth 
for MMI IX. Thus ,  the expected gain t o  a building owner of bui lding 
t o  UBC S instead of UBC 3 is app roximately 9 percent of the value of 
the s t ructure, conditional of the occurrence of an earthquake that 
p roduces MMI VIII or higher shaking at the site. Of cours e ,  s ociety 
would derive addit i onal benefits f rom this change in codes . The mos t  
important e lement of the additional s ocial gain i s  the increase in the 
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p roportion of buildings that a re destroyed but tha t do not collapse, 
as build ing collapse is the p rincipal threat to life as well as the 
p rincipal dis rup ting event to the norma l life of the communigy .  
The second e lement entering int o the es timate of G ( fx (K,x,i) ) 
is the cost of adopting UBC S compa red to UBC 3.  Whitman, et al 
have performed an engineering design s t udy of the cost of constructing 
buildings buildings to satisfy various building codes , and their 
res ults are s ummarized in Figure 1. As the figure makes c lear, 
moving f rom UBC 3 to UBC S increases the cos t  of a s t ruc t ure by 1 to 5 
percent, d epending up on the type of s truc t ure. This neglects the 
va lue of the c ontents of the s truc ture, which is i gnored here. 
Based up on these calculations , in the range of UBC 3 and 
UBC S, the value of G (fx (K,x,i ) ) can be p laced within the range of 
-2 and - 9. Armed with this inf ormation, expression (3) can now be 
c rude ly estimated .  
Table 6 shows calc ulated values of the left s ide of ( 3) based 
on several values of p, G ( fx) and r that are p ossible candidates f or the
"correct" value f or a particular s t ructure. Comparison of the res ults 
f or different values of these parameters p rovides a sensitivity analysis 
of the model. At the p oint of minimization of expected p rivate costs, 
( 3) would eq ua l  zero. P ositive entires in the matrix correspond t o  
combinations of values o f  the variables in ( 3 )  that indicate that 
UBC S goes beyond the degree of seismic resistivity that minimizes the 
p rivat e  cos t  func tion that includes seismic risks . Negative ent ries 
c orrespond to situations in which even UBC S falls short of the bes t  
design t o  p rotect the private inves tment in the s t ruc ture. 
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Figure 1 
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For the p ilot building in the Whitman , et a l. study, which 
was the basis for calculatin g  Tables 4 and 5, the c osts of moving 
from UBC 3 to UBC S are about 5 p ercent of t otal c os ts s o  that the 
value of f
x
(K,x) is approximat ely -1. 8.  For a discount rate of . 10 
and a probability eq ual t o  ,01 that shaking of MMI VIII or gr eat er 
will occur, the value of ( 3) is ,8, Mor e  generally , realis t ic values 
of the variables -- e.g. ( f
x
) less than 9, r near . 10 or h igher,
and p less than ,02 -- pr od uc e  a pattern of p os it ive entries . 
This means that UB C S involves more res is t ivity than own ers 
of structures would freely p ick -- a happy result in t erms of 
verify ing the model us ed herein , becaus e owners are now obs erved 
rarely t o  adop t  UBC S on th eir own,-/ Thes e results als o  c on firm 
_I Whitman, et al. ( 1975) , note that the time of the 1971 S an 
Fernand o earthquake, the Los Angeles building s t ock was v ulnerable 
becaus e most buildings were n ot being built t o  this standard . They 
also make a s imilar obs ervation about B os t on. 
the view that th e principal p urp os e  of c odes is to int ernalize 
ext ernal effects , rather than to offs et irrationality or ignorance. 
One can readily c ompute the va lue of the ext ernal cos ts that are 
implicit in UB C S, In order for ( 3)1 to be zero ( given r and p ) ,  
G ( f;>+H (K,gx ) would have t o  be -10. For this t o  be the case, the
c osts of moving from UBC 3 and UB C S would have to t otal . 9  of a 
p ercent of the c osts  of the s tructur e  rather than about 5 p ercent . 
To force th e p ilot building t o  satis fy UB C S is , imp licitly ,  t o  
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value the avoidance of damage other than t o  the s tr uctur e  that 
UB C S makes p os s ible at about 4 . 5  t imes the value of th e savings 
to th e building from adopting UB C S ,  According t o  the calc ulations 
bas ed on Tables 4 and 5, the lat t er is approximat ely 9 p ercen t ,  s o  
the bott om line of the calculations is that ,  given an earthq uake of 
damaging int ensity , the savings from UBC S other than t o  the owner 
mus t equal about 40 p ercen t  of the value of the building.  
The prec ed ing calc ulations are offered as illus trations of 
the us es t o  which the analys is and data s ummarized in this pap er can 
be p ut .  Forty p ercent of the c os t  of a thir t een-st ory building may 
or may not be a good es t imat e  of the savings in t erms of ext ernal 
c osts that would accrue, given a damaging ear thquake, if the buildings 
wer e  built t o  UB C S spec ifications ins t ead of UBC 3. Wha t ever the 
answer t o  this loaded q uestion, the typ e  of analys is provided in this 
paper provid es a mechanism for c ollaps ing the debate about s eismic 
building c od es int o  the rather s imple framework of whether the 
exp ect e� savings are worth the c os t .  Mor eover, the proc ess of making 
thes e  calc ulations is instruc t ive becaus e  it enc ount ers many r elat ively 
diffic ult data problems along the way . In par t icular, information on 
the und erlying events that give r is e  t o  s eismic c od es -- namely, the 
intensity of shaking from earthquakes that can be exp ec t ed d ur ing the 
life of a struc t ur e  -- is too p oor to make mor e  than crud e  empirical 
efforts p ossible. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKE PREDICTIONS 
In this sect ion a more gen eral inves tment problem is analyzed, 
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that of maximizing the (nonzero) return s of a capital investment .  The 
a sset is threatened by a random event tha t, if it occur s, will r ed uce 
the earnings po tentia l o f  the asse t .  This formulation i s  not useful 
for empirical p urposes, because i t  a ssumes data regarding the 
expected r evenue stream from a str uc t ure a s  a f unction o f  the 
amo unt of investment made in i t .  A more general formulation i s  
valuab le f o r  deriving theoretical results. The model formulated here 
is used to investigate changes in investment patterns that will r esult 
from improved earthquake prediction technology .  
Define R ( K) to be t h e  annual income earned from an investment 
K if the structure has no t yet been damaged by an earthquak e .-
/ 
_/ The revenue may depend on x as well, a ssuming renters can t ell the 
seismic resistivity of a struc t ure by examining i t .  Making x an 
argument of R greatly comp licates the manipulations to follow, b ut i t  
does n o t  change t h e  q ualitative theoretical result s o r  the imp lications 
for emp irical work. 
The revenue f unct ion, R ( K) ,  is a ssumed to exhibit positive mar ginal 
revenue of capital (� > O) for at least some K > O, b ut with
dec lining mar gina l r evenue for all values o f  K (e.g. �K < 0),
Revenues are assumed to be the same in each year , an assumption that 
greatly simp lifies the theoretical exposition. The revenue f unc tion 
is not a ssumed to be linear, for locational factors are likely to 
produce an optimal K for each sit e .  O f  cour se ,  this does not imp ly 
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noncompeti tive behavior -- fo r each K, the builder can be a price 
taker, but face a given f unctional relationship between K and R that 
a llows a single choice of K and x that produces nonnegative profits. 
Let F(t)  be the probabi lity that an earthquake that would ca use 
struc t ural co llap se of x = 0 will occur by time t in the area of 
seismic risk in which the str uc t ure i s  located, with time t = 0 the 
date of construction of the str uc t ure, on the notation in S ection I, 
p (t) = F
�
(t) . 
A convenient minimum value, m*, for the magnit ude of 
earthquakes considered here is one which causes some modern bui ldings 
to suffer co llap se if they are no t constructed to withstand seismic 
shocks, i . e. ,  if x 0 .  The same earthq uake causes moderate to 
heavy damage in some o f  the struc t ures f ur ther from the center of 
the earthq uake fault . The probabi lity density f unction (p .d.f,) , q (i ) , 
di stinguishes between areas subj ect to different degrees of ground 
shaking. If F(t,m) is the c umulative distribution f unction ( C. D . F . )  
from time zero to t ime t o f  an earthquake of magnitude m :'._ m*, and if
q (i jm) i s  the cond itional p .d . f ,  of intensity i > i 0, given a 
magnitude m earthquake, the�: 
F( t) IF(t,m) dm, and 
m > m* 
Iq ( i j m) F ( t ,m) dm
m> m* 
q (i) iF ( t ,m) dm
m > m* 
Within this framework, the profit-maximization prob lem 
of a private inve stor contemplating an inve stmen t in a building is: 
Max 
K , x  
N � R(K) e-(r+v) tdt
t =O 
I N 
(l + x) K 
� � R(K) f (K , x , i) F(t) q(i) e-(r+v) tdtdi • 
i=i t =O 
0 
The f irst term is the discounted present value of the 
stream of revenues from the structure ,  the second term is the total 
cost of the structure (including defensive co st s built into the 
buil ding) , and the third term represents the discoun te d presen t 
value of expecte d revenue loss due to earthquake s.  
The neces sary conditions for a maximum for this prof it 
expre ssion are: 
(4 ) R ' (K) ( 1-e:�:v) N ) -(l+x) 
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- tJ r' (K) f (K, x ,  i) + R(K) '. (K, x ,  ii } (i) L F( <) "-(r+v) '" l di 
0 
( 5) 
o. 
I 
K +f
i=i 
0 
N � R(K) fx(K , x , i) q (i) J F(t ) e -(r+v) tdt } di 
t =O 
o. 
N 
The in tegral of the discoun ted C.D. F. (! F(t ) e-(r+v) t dt) will be 
t =O 
written as J. The secon d order con ditions are as follows: 
(6) R " (K) l-e
-(r+v) N
r + v 
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- J J { R" (K) f (K , x, i) + 2R(K) fK(K , x , i) + R(K) fKl((K , x, i)} q (i) di
i=i 
(7) 
(8) 
0 
< o. 
1 
J f R(K) fxx(K, x , i) q (i) di < 0 .
i=i 
0 
I 
1 + J f {R '  (K) fx(K,x, i) + R(K) fKx(K,x , i)} q (i) di < 0. _/
i=i 
0 
_/ The actual condit ion on this term is that it be less than a 
str ictly nega t ive term involving expres sions (6) and (7); however , 
only the weaker ver sion in (8) will be use d  below. 
These conditions ,  .
esp ecially (4)  and (5) , permit some
e :xplorat ion of the effects of the introduct ion of pre diction technology 
by use of a convent ional comparative statics analy sis . A valid 
earthquake prediction can be expresse d as an increase in F(t ) , and 
hence J, for values of t near zero . Conversely , the absence of a 
prediction supports the negative inference tha t , for t near zero , 
F(t) is less than the historical frequency of seismic shocks.  
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Total differentiat ion of (4 ) and ( 5) produces the following 
conditions : 
(10) 
( 9) dx 
dJ 
[ i + J  1 � R '  (K) fx (K, x, i)  + R" (K) fKx (K, x, i) f q ( i ) di]
i 0 
dx [ 1 - (r+v) N R' (K) -e 
= dJ _
_ 
r
_
+_v ___ - J J l 
i 
0 
R" (K) f (K, x, i)  + 2R'  (K) f
K
(K,x, i )
- [J ]_ 
0 
+ R(K) fKK (K, x, i) ! q ( i)di] 
l R' (K) f (K, x, i) + R(K) fK (K, x, i) � q ( i) di] . 
I 
dx (R(K) J f fxx (K, x, i) q (i) di)dJ 
i 
0
I � R '  (K) fx (K, x, i) + R (K) fxK(K, x, i)  ! q ( i) di) -dx (l + J f dJ 
i 
0 
I 
+ R (K) f fx (K,x, i) q (i) di. -I 
i 
0 
_/ I t  is assumed that q ( i) is insensitive to changes in J, e. g.  a posi tive
predict ion r aises the probability of all large ear thquakes occurring. 
Given the current s tate of knowledge on the relation of intens i t y  
and ground-shaking for very l arge ear thquakes, the to ta l area 
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affec ted increases with magnitude but the ratio of land suffering 
heavy damage to land suffering total damage remains roughly the 
same (see Section II) . However, a prediction might narrow the 
variance of the expected magnitude of the earthquake. If it predicts an 
increased chance of a maj or earthquake but rules out a great 
earthquake, t} might be negative . The left sides of both (9) and 
(10) then include the term 
I 
- J R (K) f fx (K, x, i) �J (i)di
i 
0
which is indeterminate in sign. 
From the second-order condi tions and the assumptions about the functional 
forms of R (K) and f (K, x, i) ,  all of the terms ( 9) and (10) can be signed, 
and the following es tablished. 
Proposition 1 :  I f  an earthquake is predicted (i. e. , d J  > O) , the
op t imum expenditure on capital s tructures, K, will decline and the 
optimum expenditure proportion devo ted to protection, x, will increase ; 
conversely, the absence of a prediction will have the opposite 
effects. 
The invention of reliable prediction technology will, then, 
have an indeterminate effect on the safety of buildings, depending on 
the form predictions take and the freq uency of predic tion. At one 
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extreme , predic tions might be certain , and may foresee some fraction , 
oc ,  of all ear thquakes . Because earthquakes that affect any given 
locality are extremely rare events , in nearly all years this prediction 
technology would forecast no even t .  
In these years , the expected probability of a damaging 
earthquake would be ( 1-cx: ) h ,  where h is the his torical frequency , and 
F (t )  would be correspondingly reduced . Only rarely would F ( t )  be 
increased in the immediate years , and so , according to Proposition 1, 
the net effect over time of the introduction of prediction technology 
would be to reduce the strength of most structures . 
At the o ther extreme , a prediction technique might detect 
conditions that are only weakly associated with earthquakes but that 
occur frequently . Le tting 8 represent the increment to h that makes 
(h + o )  be the probability of a damaging ear thquake when the condition
is present , as long as the condition is observed sufficiently 
frequently the impact of the predic tion could be to raise the mean 
s trength of buildings , depending on the exact shape of R (x) and 
f (K, x , i) . 
Proposition 1 holds for any source of change in the value 
of J. In addit ion to changes in the C . D . F .  of maj or ear thquakes , J 
also depends on N ( the life of the structure) and r (the interest 
rate) . Thus , by the same reasoning applied to changes in F ( t )  due to 
predictions , the following proposition can also be established 
(as well as its converse) . 
Proposit ion 2 :  A fall in the interes t rate or an increase in the 
durability of s tructures that is unrelated to seismic resistivity will 
lead to an increase in defenses against earthquakes . 
Table 6 in Section II provides s ome further insight into the
consequences of long-term earthquake predictions . If r is .10 and 
G ( fx (K, x , i ) )  is - 2 ,  consider the effect of a prediction that an
earthquake was certain to occur in, say ,  the next ten years . In this 
cas e ,  p would equal .1, and the value of expression (3) would become
s trongly negative . In fac t ,  for any time horizon under twenty years , 
the UBC S code would become less stringent than the s tandard that 
would minimize private costs . Alternatively , suppose a prediction 
technology indicates that for the next decade the chance of an earthquake 
has been halved , from a normal . 01 to . 005. Because of discounting , 
this eliminates mos t  of the pres ent-value benefits of a s tronger 
s truc ture,  and would cause UBC S to become even less attractive to 
owners of buildings . Indeed , requiring UBC S in the face of such a 
prediction, given r . 10 and g (f
x) = -
2 ,  implies a social benefit 
equal to about nine times th� expected benefits to the s tructure , 
rather than the fourfold relationship that would j ustify UBC S 
without a prediction . 
IV . CONCLUSIONS 
By casting the problem of optimal seismic resis tance as a 
standard problem of optimal investment under uncertainty , two useful 
results have emerged . Firs t ,  a method has been developed that enables 
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the analyst to u s e  engineering cos t informa tion and other available 
data to es timate the minimum social benefits that a strengthening o f  
the code must provide to be worthwhile . Second , the same method 
permits an estimation of the effects of changes in information about 
the frequency of earthquakes , such as valid predictions , on the 
private choice of s eismic resistivity and on the implicit social 
benefit that j us tifies a particular code . Because of negative 
inferences from the absence of predictions , the introduction of a 
prediction method has an indeterminat e  but potentially important 
effect on incentives to defend against seismic shocks . 
